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ON THE COMPACTNESS PROPERTY OF EXTENSIONS OF FIRST-ORDER
GO¨DEL LOGIC
SEYED MOHAMMAD AMIN KHATAMI
Abstract. We study three kinds of compactness in some variants of Go¨del logic: compactness, en-
tailment compactness, and approximate entailment compactness. For countable first-order underlying
language we use the Henkin construction to prove the compactness property of extensions of first-order
Go¨del logic enriched by nullary connective or the Baaz’s projection connective. In the case of uncount-
able first-order language we use the ultraproduct method to derive the compactness theorem.
Keywords: Mathematical fuzzy logic; Go¨del logic; Rational Go¨del logic; Compactness theorem
1. Introduction
Compactness theorem is one of the most important theorems in classical first-order logic. This theorem
says that any finitely satisfiable theory is satisfiable. Certainly, this property provides a procedure to
find models of a theory whose finite subsets have models. So, it could be considered as a foundation
for model theoretical studies of any logic. Due to the fact that the model theory of mathematical fuzzy
logic is still underdeveloped, study of compactness property would be a topic of interest in the area of
mathematical fuzzy logic. In the case of t-norm based fuzzy logics and their extensions, this is done by
several authors [Ha´j98, BZ98, NB01, Ger01, CN04, BYU10, Pre03, Cin05, TPD11, PT12].
Among t-norm based fuzzy logics, three of them are quite important (Go¨del ,  Lukasiewicz , and
product logic). So, almost all studies around compactness property are done for these triple.Note that
various kinds of compactness are available for t-norm based fuzzy logic, e.g., compactness [NB01, Ger01,
CN04, Cin05], entailment compactness [BZ98, Pre03, Cin05]and K-compactness [Cin05, TPD11, PT12]
where K is a closed subset of standard truth value set [0, 1]. The usual compactness is the same as
{1}-compactness. Let us remind that a logic enjoys the entailment compactness if for every theory T
and sentence ϕ, T |= ϕ implies the existence of a finite subset T ′ of T such that T ′ |= ϕ.
In first-order Go¨del logic, different truth value sets cause different results about compactness. A
truth value set in general is taken to be any linearly ordered Heyting algebra D. The standard truth
value set is commonly assumed to be a Go¨del set which is a closet subset of [0, 1] containing 0 and 1.
The first-order Go¨del logic whose truth value set is a Go¨del set V is denoted by GV . Recently, all tree
mentioned instance of compactness are studied for Go¨del set GV [PT12, Pre03]. Furthermore, [Pre03]
studies the extensions of Go¨del logic GV by ∆ Baaz projection connective.
In  Lukasiewicz logic as well as its extension such as rational Pavelka logic (RPL) and continuous
first-order logic (CFO) the compactness theorem is extensively studied in several frameworks [Ha´j98,
CEG07, EGGN07, Pav79, TPD11, BYU10]. The continuity of logical connectives of  Lukasiewicz logic
with respect to the usual order topology on [0, 1] is the main reason for the compactness theorem to
be held in these logics. By different methods such as Henkin construction, Pavelka completeness, and
ultraproduct method the compactness theorem proved in these logics.
Study of the compactness property for extensions of Go¨del logic is different from two viewpoints.
Firstly, the Go¨del logic implication is not a continuous function with respect to the usual order topology
on Go¨del sets. So, the Pavelka method and ultraproduct method could not be used directly in extensions
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of Go¨del logic. However, a modification of these methods may work here. Secondly, the corresponding
algebras with respect to the extensions of Go¨del logics can not be embedded into the standard truth
value sets (Go¨del sets) unless the algebras are at most countable. But, we need such an embedding to
prove the compactness theorem by the Henkin construction . So, the Henkin construction only works
for theories with at most countable first-order underlying languages.
We consider two approaches to prove the compactness property in extensions of Go¨del logics. The
first one is based on the Henkin construction, and so it works only for theories with at most countable
first-order underlying languages. The other approach is based on the ultraproduct method. We consider
a metric on Go¨del sets such that the logical connectives of the corresponding extension of Go¨del logic
are continuous with respect to the new metric.
In  Lukasiewicz logic if ”e” is a similarity relation, then the interpretation of ”1 − e” becomes a
pseudometric. But, we have not a logical connective such as ”minus” in Go¨del logic. However, if one
considers a reverse semantical meaning on truth value set, the interpretation of similarity relation will
be a pseudometric in any t-norm based fuzzy logic. Furthermore, assuming such a semantic leads to
obtain a pseudometric on the corresponding algebras of the logic. Besides these two pseudometrics,
the continuity of logical connectives and also continuity of the interpretation of function and predicate
symbols are directly intelligible. So, using the ultraproduct method motivates us to consider a reverse
semantical meaning on Go¨del sets which we call it the metrically semantic of the logic. Thus, 0 stands for
absolute truth while 1 for absolute falsity. Anyway, we present a translation of results for the everyday
Go¨del logic in the final section.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the main notions of extensions of
Go¨del logic such as logical connectives, metrically semantic, satisfiability, and so forth. Section 3 studies
the main concept of the paper by studding different notions of compactness in several kinds of extensions
of Go¨del logic. Section 4 presents the notion of ultrametric structure and prove the compactness property
for some variants of Go¨del logics without any limitation on the size of the underlying first-order language.
In the last section, a translation of results for the usual semantic (in which 0 stands for falsity) is given.
2. Preliminaries
The logic that we will consider in this paper is the Go¨del logic whose semantic is based on Go¨del sets,
i.e, subsets of unite interval [0, 1] containing 0 and 1 and closed under the standard order topology.
Logical symbols of the first-order Go¨del logic are the usual connectives of classical first-order logic
{∧,→,⊥} together with the quantifiers {∀, ∃} and a countable set of variables.
We use a reverse semantical meaning on the set of truth values. Indeed, this assumption makes the
interpretation of similarity relation a pseudometric. So, semantically 0 is the absolute truth and 1 is the
absolute falsity of the truth value set.
When a Go¨del set V is considered as the set of truth values, we use the notion GV for corresponding
Go¨del logic. Enriching GV by a countable set of nullary connectives A¯ = {r¯ : r ∈ A ⊆ V \ {0, 1}} leads
to an extension of Go¨del logic, GV,A. Observe that the nullary connective 1¯ is actually ⊥. Another
extension of Go¨del logic is obtained by adding the unary connective ∆. The corresponding Go¨del logics
equipped by ∆ are denoted by G∆V or G
∆
V,A, respectively. Lets take an abbreviation for some Go¨del logics:
• GR: V = [0, 1] and A = ∅.
• G↓: V = [0, 1]↓ and A = (0, 1)↓ where [0, 1]↓ = {
1
n : n ∈ N} ∪ {0} and (0, 1)↓ = [0, 1]↓ \ {0, 1}.
• Gn: V = {r1, ..., rn} ∪ {0, 1} and A = {r1, ..., rn} where 0 < r1 < r2 < ... < rn−1 < rn < 1.
• G∗↓: V = [0, 1] and A = (0, 1)↓.
• G∗n: V = [0, 1] and A = {r1, ..., rn} where 0 < r1 < r2 < ... < rn−1 < rn < 1.
• RGL: V = [0, 1] and A = (0, 1) ∩Q.
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Within this paper, we assume that L is a first-order language. L-terms and L-formulas are constructed
as in classical first-order logic. Basic notions of free and bound variable, L-sentence and L-theory are
defined as usual. In particular, note that r¯ is an L-sentence in GV,A for each r ∈ A. The set of L-
formulas and L-sentences are denoted by Form(L) and Sent(L), respectively. When there is no danger
of confusion, we may omit the prefix L and simply write a term, formula, etc.
Definition 2.1. For a given language L, an L-structure M in Go¨del logic GV,A is a nonempty set M
called the universe of M together with:
(1) for any n-ary predicate symbol P of L, a function PM :Mn → V ,
(2) for any n-ary function symbol f of L, a function fM :Mn →M ,
(3) for any constant symbol c of L, an element cM in the universe of M.
When the underlying language is clear, M is called a structure.
For each α ∈ L, αM is called the interpretation of α in M. The interpretation of terms is defined as
follows.
Definition 2.2. For every n-tuple variable x¯ and every term t(x¯),the interpretation of t(x¯) in M is a
function tM : Mn →M such that
(1) if t(x¯) = xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then tM(a¯) = ai,
(2) if t(x¯) = c then tM(a¯) = cM,
(3) if t(x¯) = f(t1(x¯), ..., tn(x¯)) then t
M(a¯) = fM(tM1 (a¯), ..., t
M
n (a¯)).
Considering 0 as the absolute truth makes some changes in some semantical issues. For example, the
interpretation of ϕ∧ψ in a structure is absolutely true whenever the interpretation of both of them are
absolutely true, i.e, the maximum of their interpretations must be absolutely true. The interpretation
of formulas is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3. The interpretation of a formula ϕ(x¯) in an L-structure M in the Go¨del logic GV,A
(G∆V,A) is a function ϕ
M : Mn → V which is inductively determined as follows.
(1) ⊥M = 1, and for each r ∈ A ∪ {0}, r¯M = r.
(2) For every n-ary predicate symbol P , PM(t1(a¯), ..., tn(a¯)) = P
M(tM1 (a¯), ..., t
M
n (a¯)).
(3) (ϕ ∧ ψ)M(a¯) = max{ϕM(a¯), ψM(a¯)}.
(4) (ϕ→ ψ)M(a¯) = ϕM(a¯) .→ ψM(a¯), where x .→ y =
{
0 x ≥ y,
y x < y.
(5) If ϕ(x¯) = ∀y ψ(y, x¯) then ϕM(a¯) = sup
b∈M
{ψM(b, a¯)}.
(6) If ϕ(x¯) = ∃y ψ(y, x¯) then ϕM(a¯) = inf
b∈M
{ψM(b, a¯)}.
(7) (Only for G∆V,A) (∆(ϕ))
M(a¯) =
{
0 ϕM(a¯) = 0,
1 otherwise.
Observe that since V is a closed subset of [0, 1], all infima and suprema exist. One can consider an
abbreviation for compound connectives ¬,∨,⇒ and ↔.
• ¬ϕ := ϕ→ ⊥.
• ϕ ∨ ψ := ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ) ∧ ((ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ).
• ϕ⇒ ψ := (ψ → ϕ)→ ψ.
• ϕ↔ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
The interpretations of formulas including these new connectives can be computed as follows.
• ¬ϕM(a¯) =
{
0 ϕM(a¯) = 1,
1 ϕM(a¯) < 1.
• (ϕ ∨ ψ)M(a¯) = min{ϕM(a¯), ψM(a¯)}.
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• (ϕ⇒ ψ)M(a¯) =
{
0 ϕM(a¯) > ψM(a¯) > 0,
ψM(a¯) ϕM(a¯) ≤ ψM(a¯).
• (ϕ↔ ψ)M(a¯) = dmax(ϕM(a¯), ψM(a¯)), where dmax(x, y) =
{
0 x = y,
max{x, y} x 6= y.
Definition 2.4. Let ϕ(x¯) be an L-formula and T be an L-theory.
(1) An L-structure M is called a model of ϕ(x¯), if there is a¯ ∈Mn such that ϕM(a¯) = 0. In such a
case, we write M |= ϕ(a¯).
(2) ϕ(x¯) is called a satisfiable formula if there is an L-structure M which models ϕ(x¯).
(3) If an L-structure M models all sentences of T , we call T a satisfiable theory an write M |= T .
(4) T is called finitely satisfiable if every finite subset of T has a model.
(5) For an L-sentence ϕ we say that T entails ϕ, T |= ϕ, if every model of T models ϕ. We write
T
f
|=ϕ if there exists a finite subset S of T so that S |= ϕ. If there is no finite subset S of T such
that S |= ϕ, we write T
f
✓|=ϕ. We use |= ϕ instead of ∅ |= ϕ.
For any Go¨del set V and A ⊆ V , the axioms of the Go¨del logic GV,A are the axioms of first-order
Go¨del logic [Ha´j98] together with the book-keeping axioms listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Axioms and Rules of GV,A
Axioms of fist-order Go¨del logic
(G1) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ))
(G2) (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ
(G3) (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (ψ ∧ ϕ)
(G4) ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ϕ)
(G5) (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))↔ ((ϕ ∧ ψ)→ χ)
(G6) ((ϕ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → ϕ)→ χ)→ χ)
(G7) 1¯→ ϕ
(G∀1) (∀xϕ(x))→ ϕ(t) (t substitutable for x in ϕ(x))
(G∀2)
(
∀x (ψ → ϕ(x))
)
→
(
ψ → (∀xϕ(x))
)
(x not free in ψ)
(G∀3)
(
∀x (ψ ∨ ϕ(x))
)
→
(
ψ ∨ (∀xϕ(x))
)
(x not free in ψ)
(G∃1) ϕ(t)→ (∃xϕ(x)) (t substitutable for x in ϕ(x))
(G∃2)
(
∀x (ϕ(x)→ ψ)
)
→
(
(∃xϕ(x)) → ψ
)
(x not free in ψ)
Book-keeping axioms for nullary connectives
(RG1) r¯ ∧ s¯↔ max{r, s}
(RG2(a)) r¯ → s¯ (for r ≥ s)
(RG2(b)) (r¯ → s¯)↔ s¯ (for r < s)
(RG3) ¬¬r¯ (for r < 1)
Rules
(Mp) ϕ, (ϕ→ ψ) ⊢ ψ
(Gen) ϕ ⊢ ∀xϕ
Definition 2.5. An L-sentence ϕ is proved by an L-theory T , T ⊢ ϕ, whenever there is a finite sequence
{ϕi}ni=1 of L-sentences such that:
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• for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n either ϕi ∈ T or ϕi is an axiom or it is followed by rules from axioms and
other ϕj ’s for 1 ≤ j < i.
• ϕn = ϕ.
We write ⊢ ϕ whenever ∅ ⊢ ϕ. T is called a consistent theory if T 0 ⊥.
Note that if A 6= ∅ then for any 0 < r < 1, T = {r¯} is a consistent theory in GV,A. However, T
is not a satisfiable theory. In the next section we introduced the notion of strongly consistency which
is equivalent to the notion of satisfiability in some extensions of Go¨del logics. The deduction theorem
follows easily.
Theorem 2.6. In the Go¨del logic GV,A, for an L-theory T and L-sentences ϕ and ψ,
T ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ if and only if T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ.
Obviously if T ⊢ ϕ, then T |= ϕ and also T
f
|=ϕ. In spite of first-order logic, the concept of proof
does not coincide completely with the concept of finitely entailment in Go¨del logics enriched by nullary
connectives.
Example 2.7. Let A 6= ∅. One could easily verify that in the Go¨del logic G[0,1],A if L = {ρ} where ρ is
a nullary predicate symbol and r ∈ A \ {0, 1}, then ¬¬ρ→ r¯ |= ¬ρ while ¬¬ρ→ r¯ 0 ¬ρ.
Remark 2.8. For Go¨del logics enriched by ∆ connective, there are some additional axioms and rules.
∆1) ∆ϕ ∨ ¬∆ϕ.
∆2) ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (∆ϕ ∨∆ψ).
∆3) ∆ϕ→ ϕ.
∆4) ∆ϕ→ ∆∆ϕ.
∆5) ∆(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∆ϕ→ ∆ψ).
∆R) ϕ ⊢ ∆ϕ.
Definition 2.9. A Go¨del logic has complete recursive axiomatization whenever |= ϕ if and only if ⊢ ϕ
for every L-sentence ϕ. This kind of completeness is sometimes called weak completeness.
Definition 2.10. A Go¨del logic is said to have the strong completeness whenever for every L-theory T
and L-sentence ϕ, T |= ϕ if and only if T ⊢ ϕ.
First-order Go¨del logic GR admits both kinds of completeness with respect to any countable first-order
language [Ha´j98]. When A 6= ∅ example 2.7 shows that the strong completeness fails in G[0,1],A while it
is shown that G[0,1],A is completely recursive axiomatizable [EGN09].
One of the most useful tools in model theory of classical first-order logic is the compactness theorem.
In the case of mathematical fuzzy logic this theorem has different aspects.
Definition 2.11. A Go¨del logic is said to enjoy the entailment compactness whenever for any theory T
and sentence ϕ,
T |= ϕ if and only if T
f
|=ϕ.
Definition 2.12. The Go¨del logic GV,A (G
∆
V,A) has the approximate entailment compactness property
if for every theory T and sentence ϕ,
T |= ϕ if and only T |= r¯→ ϕ for all r ∈ A ∪ {1}.
Definition 2.13. We say that a Go¨del logic has the compactness property if for every theory T ,
T is satisfiable if and only if T is finitely satisfiable.
Since a proof is a finite sequence of conclusions, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 2.14. If a logic admits the strong completeness then it enjoys the triple kinds of compactness
mentioned above.
Specially, in the Go¨del logic GR both entailment compactness and compactness hold.
Theorem 2.15. [Pre03] The entailment compactness and complete recursive axiomatization (weak com-
pleteness) are equivalent in Go¨del logic GV .
Furthermore, Prening [Pre03] shows the Go¨del logic GV admits the entailment compactness property
if and only if either V is a finite Go¨del set or the perfect kernel of V includes 1 or the perfect kernel of
V is nonempty and 1 is an isolated point of V . Particularly, he shows that the entailment compactness
fails in GV for countable Go¨del set V .
Later, Pourmahdian et al. [PT12] show that if V is a finite Go¨del set or the perfect kernel of V
includes 1 or 1 is an isolated point of V then GV admits the compactness property.
3. Compactness in Go¨del logic G[0,1],A
In this section, we study the compactness property of Go¨del logics G[0,1],A and also G
∆
[0,1],A. From
now on assume that A′ is denoted for the set of limit points of A in a Go¨del set V with respect to the
order topology on V . Firstly, note that if A has a limit point a 6= 0 with respect to the order topology
and a ∈ A ∪ {1}, then the compactness fails in G[0,1],A as well as G
∆
[0,1],A.
Example 3.1. Let a ∈ A′ ∩ (A ∪ {1}) and assume that L = {ρ} where ρ is a nullary predicate symbol.
Suppose that {ri}∞i=1 ⊆ A \ {a} is an increasing (decreasing) sequence whose limit in V is a. Let
T = {a ⇒ ρ} ∪ {ρ → ri}∞i=1 (T = {ρ ⇒ a} ∪ {ri → ρ}
∞
i=1). Obviously T is finitely satisfiable, but it is
not satisfiable.
Example 3.2. Let a ∈ A′ but a /∈ A∪{1}. Also assume that there is an increasing sequence {ri}∞i=1 ⊆ A
and a decreasing sequence {si}∞i=1 ⊆ A so that limi ri = a = limi si. Let L = {ρ,R(x)} where ρ is a
nullary predicate symbol and R(x) is a unary predicate symbol. Let T = {∃x
(
(r¯i+1 → R(x))∧ (R(x) →
r¯i)
)
}∞i=1 ∪ {s¯i ⇒
(
∀xR(x)
)
}∞i=1 ∪ {
(
∀xR(x)
)
⇒ ρ} ∪ {ρ → ri}∞i=1. T is finitely satisfiable, but it is not
satisfiable. Indeed ifM |= T , then
(
∀xR(x)
)M
= a and so the interpretation of ρ inM makes no sense.
Specially, RGL does not admit the compactness property. However, if one consider some non-standard
truth value set, the compactness may hold on RGL. [KPT13] prove that the compactness property is
hold on RGL within a semantic on the non-standard truth value set I = [0, 1]2 \ {(0, r) : r > 0}.
Now, using the Henkin construction, we show in the case that the set of limit points of A is at most
{0}, the Go¨del logic G[0,1],A admits the compactness property. Observe that this method is based on
constructing the Go¨del algebra of equivalence classes of formulas modulo a theory, and then embedding
this Go¨del algebra into the unit interval [0, 1], where the countability of the language L is a prerequisite
necessary assumption for existence of such an embedding. In the next section, we prove the compactness
property for some extensions of Go¨del logics in which the requirement of such an assumption is not
obligatory.
Definition 3.3. The Go¨del algebra with respect to the Go¨del logic GV,A is a bounded lattice D = 〈D, .∧
, .∨, 0D, 1D〉 together with a binary operation .→ and for each r ∈ A \ {0, 1} an element rD ∈ D such that:
(1) .∧ is the join (lub) operator and .∨ is the meet (glb) operator.
(2) .∧ and .→ form an adjoint pair, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ D,
a .∧ b ≥D c iff a ≥D b
.→ c,
where a ≥D b if and only if a .∧ b = a.
(3) D is pre-linear, i.e, for all a, b ∈ D,
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(a
.→ b) .∨ (b .→ a) = 0D.
(4) rD .∧ sD = max{r, s}D.
(5) rD .→ sD = 0D iff r ≥ s.
(6) rD
.→ sD = sD iff r < s.
(7) 0D < rD < 1D for all 0 < r < 1.
The Go¨del algebra with respect to the Go¨del logic G∆V,A is formed by the corresponding Go¨del algebra
with respect to GV,A, i.e., D = 〈D, .∧,
.∨, .→, {rD : r ∈ A ∪ {0, 1}}〉 together with a unary operation δD
which acts as follows.
(8) δD(0D) = 0D.
(9) δD(a) = 1D for all a ∈ D \ {0D}.
Example 3.4. The standard Go¨del algebra with respect to G[0,1],A is [0, 1]A = 〈[0, 1],max,min,
.→, {r :
r ∈ A ∪ {0, 1}}〉. The standard Go¨del algebra corresponding to G∗n and G
∗
↓ is denoted by [0, 1]
∗
n and
[0, 1]∗↓, respectively.
Lemma 3.5. If A′ ⊆ {0}, then any countable linear ordered Go¨del algebra D with respect to G[0,1],A
can be continuously embedded into the standard Go¨del algebra [0, 1]A (i.e. an embedding that preserves
all suprema and infima that exist in D). Particulary, any countable linear ordered Go¨del algebra D with
respect to G∗n and G
∗
↓ can be continuously embedded into the standard Go¨del algebra [0, 1]
∗
n and [0, 1]
∗
↓,
respectively.
Proof. As [Ha´j98, Lemma 5.3.1], set D′ = D×{0}∪
⋃
{{u}×((0, 1)∩Q) : u has no successor in D} which
ordered lexicographically by induced ordering ≤D of D. By setting rD
′
= (r, 0) for each nullary connective
r¯, one can easily construct a countable densely linearly ordered Go¨del algebra D′. Furthermore, the
mapping u→ (u, 0) is a continuous embedding from D into D′ wherein the image of rD is rD
′
. There are
two cases.
Case 1: A′ = ∅. Thus, A is a finite set. So, the proof is similar to the proof for Go¨del logic [Ha´j98,
Lemma 5.3.2] with an easy adaptation of the back and forth method for embedding countable
densely linearly ordered Go¨del algebra D′ into [0, 1]A.
Case 2: A′ = {0}. So, there is a decreasing sequence {ri}i∈N in the open unit interval (0, 1) so that
A = {ri}i∈N and limi ri = 0. Let ‖u‖ = inf{r : u ≤
D′
rD
′
} for any u ∈ D′ . Define the
equivalence relation ∼ on D′ by
u ∼ v if and only if ‖u‖ = ‖v‖.
Now, we have
– [0D
′
]∼ = {u ∈ D′ : u ≤
D′
rD
′
i for all i ∈ N},
– if ‖u‖ = ri then [u]∼ = {u ∈ D′ : rD
′
i+1 <D′ u ≤D′ r
D
′
i },
– [1D
′
]∼ = {u ∈ D′ : rD
′
1 <D′ u ≤D′ 1
D
′
}.
For each u ∈ D′ if ‖u‖ = r ∈ A, obviously [u]∼ can be continuously embedded into (ri+1, ri] by
means of a function fr. Also [1
D
′
]∼ continuously embedded into (r1, 1] by a function like as f1.
Let f0 be the trivial constant function from [0
D
′
]∼ into {0}. Now, the function f = ∪{fr : r ∈
A ∪ {0, 1}} fulfills the proof.

3.1. Usual Compactness.
As already mentioned, if A 6= ∅ then for any 0 < r < 1, T = {r¯} is a consistent theory in GV,A which
is not satisfiable. So, when A 6= ∅ we use the ”strongly consistency” instead of ”consistency”.
Definition 3.6. An L-theory T is called strongly consistent if T 0 r¯ for r ∈ A ∪ {1} (i.e, r > 0).
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Observe that every satisfiable theory is strongly consistent. We show that when A′ ⊆ {0}, strongly
consistent theories are satisfiable. Note that Examples 3.1 and 3.2 gives strongly consistent theories
which are not satisfiable in the Go¨del logic G[0,1],A when A
′ * {0}.
Two different concepts ”finitely entailment” and ”proof” bring us two kinds of Henkin and complete
theories.
Definition 3.7. Let T be an L-theory.
(1) T is Henkin if for every universal L-formula ∀x ϕ(x) that is not finitely entailed by T , there is
a witness constant symbol c in L such that T
f
✓|=ϕ(c).
(2) T is deductively Henkin or d-Henkin if for every universal L-formula ∀x ϕ(x) that is not proved
by T , there is a witness constant symbol c in L such that T 0 ϕ(c).
(3) T is called a complete theory if for any pair of L-sentences (ϕ, ψ), either T
f
|=ϕ→ ψ or T
f
|=ψ → ϕ.
(4) T is called deductively complete or d-complete theory if for any pair of L-sentences (ϕ, ψ), either
T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ or T ⊢ ψ → ϕ.
The following theorem leads to deduced the compactness property for the Go¨del logic G[0,1],A when
A′ ⊆ {0}.
Theorem 3.8. Let L be a countable first-order language. If A′ ⊆ {0} then every strongly consistent
d-complete d-Henkin L-theory in G[0,1],A is satisfiable.
Proof. Let T be a strongly consistent deductively complete d-Henkin L-theory. Also let Lind(T ) be
the class of all T -provably equivalent L-sentences, i.e., the equivalence classes [ϕ]T of all L-sentences ϕ
modulo to the following equivalence relation.
ϕ ∼ ψ if and only if T ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ.
Define an ordering . on Lind(T ) as follows
[ϕ]T . [ψ]T if and only if T ⊢ ψ → ϕ.
Because T is a complete theory, (Lind(T ),.) is a linearly ordered set. Now, we obtain a countable
linearly ordered Go¨del algebra LT from Lind(T ) by setting,
[ϕ]T
.∨ [ψ]T = [ϕ ∨ ψ]T ,
[ϕ]T .∧ [ψ]T = [ϕ ∧ ψ]T ,
[ϕ]T
.→ [ψ]T = [ϕ→ ψ]T ,
rD = [r¯]T for any nullary connective r¯.
Axiom RG3 together with the strongly consistency of T implies that [r¯]T  [s¯]T for each r < s in A.
Thus, by Lemma 3.5 there is an embedding g from LT into the standard Go¨del algebra [0, 1]A such that
[r¯]T mapped to r.
The canonical L-structure MT of T is made as follows.
a) The universe of MT is the set of all closed L-terms CM(T ).
b) For each n-ary function symbol f , define fMT : CM(T )n → CM(T ) by
fMT (t1, ..., tn) = f(t1, ..., tn).
c) For each n-ary predicate symbol P , define PMT : CM(T )n → [0, 1] by
PMT (t1, ..., tn) = g([P (t1, ..., tn)]T ).

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For the case that A′ = ∅, the compactness property of G[0,1],A follows from Theorem 3.8 and the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.9. Let A′ = ∅. Every strongly consistent L-theory in G[0,1],A is contained in a strongly
consistent d-complete d-Henkin L′-theory such that L ⊆ L′.
Proof. Let T be a strongly consistent L theory and L′ be the extended of L with countably many new
constant symbols. Enumerate all pairs of L′-sentences by {(θi, ψi)}i∈N. Also assume that {ϕi(x)}i∈N be
the set of all L′-formulas with one free variable. Now, we construct inductively sequences {Tn}n∈N of
L′-theories and {χ
n
}n∈N of L′-sentences such that for each n ∈ N, Tn 0 χn .
stage 0: Let T0 = T and
χ
0
=
{
1 A = ∅,
minr∈A{r} otherwise.
Obviously, χ
0
> 0 and since T is strongly consistent, T0 0 χ0 .
stage n+1=2i: Let χ
n+1
= χ
n
. Now, if Tn ∪ {θi → ψi} 0 χn set Tn+1 = Tn ∪ {θi → ψi} and otherwise
set Tn+1 = Tn ∪ {ψi → θi}. Since Tn 0 χn , either Tn ∪ {θi → ψi} 0 χn or Tn ∪ {ψi → θi} 0 χn . Thus
Tn+1 0 χn+1.
stage n+1=2i+1: Let ci be a constant symbol of L′ not occurring in ϕi(x) and the constructed objects
until the current stage. Consider two cases.
Case 1: If Tn 0 χn ∨ ϕi(ci) let Tn+1 = Tn and χn+1 = χn ∨ ϕi(ci). Since Tn 0 χn , clearly in
this case Tn+1 0 χn+1.
Case 2: If Tn ⊢ χn ∨ ϕi(ci) set Tn+1 = Tn ∪ {χn → ∀xϕi(x)} and χn+1 = χn . Since Tn ⊢
χ
n
∨ϕi(ci) using (Gen) and (G∀3) we have Tn ⊢ χn∨∀xϕi(x). So, by definition of the
connective ∨ and the fact that Tn 0 χn we have Tn ∪ {∀xϕi(x) → χn} ⊢ χn . Thus,
using the proof-by-case property and the fact that Tn 0 χn , we have Tn ∪ {χn →
∀xϕi(x)} 0 χn that is Tn+1 0 χn+1.
Now, let T ′ = ∪n∈NTn. Clearly T ′ is strongly consistent, since otherwise if T ′ ⊢ r¯ for some r ∈ A ∪ {1}
then by (RG2(a)) T ′ ⊢ χ
0
. So, for some n ∈ N, Tn ⊢ χ0 which implies that Tn ⊢ χn , a contradiction.
On the other hand, clearly T ′ is deductively complete. Now, if T ′ 0 ∀xϕi(x) then T2i+1 0 χ2i+1∨ϕi(ci),
since otherwise by case 2 of stage n+1 we have T2i+1 ⊢ χ2i+1 ∨ ∀xϕi(x) which implies that T2i+2 ⊢
∀xϕi(x), a contradiction. Thus, T2i+2 = T2i+1 and χ2i+2 = χ2i+1 ∨ ϕi(ci). But then T
′ 0 ϕi(ci), since
otherwise T ′ ⊢ χ
2i+2
, a contradiction. So, T ′ is a deductively complete d-Henkin L′-theory. 
Corollary 3.10. For countable first-order language L, the Go¨del logic G∗n admit the compactness prop-
erty.
Remark 3.11. By Example 2.7 we know that the strong completeness fails in G∗n. Indeed, when T∪{ϕ} ⊆
Sent(L), A 6= ∅, and T 0 ϕ one could not obtain a deductively complete d-Henkin extension T ′ of T
such that T ′ 0 ϕ in the Go¨del logic G[0,1],A. For example, the theory T = {¬¬ρ → r¯} in Example 2.7
could not be extend to a deductively complete theory T ′ such that T ′ 0 ¬ρ.
The method used in Theorem 3.9 could not be used for the case that A′ = {0}. To prove the
compactness property of G[0,1],A for the case that A
′ = {0} we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12. Let T be a maximally strongly consistent L-theory and ϕ and ψ be two arbitrary L-
sentences. For the Go¨del logic G[0,1],A we have,
(1) T is deductively complete,
(2) if ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ T , then either ϕ ∈ T or ψ ∈ T ,
(3) if A′ = {0} and r¯ → ϕ ∈ T for r ∈ A ∪ {1}, then ϕ ∈ T .
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Proof. (1) and (2) are straightforward. For (3) we show that T ∪ {ϕ} is strongly consistent. Suppose,
, to derive a contradiction, that T ∪ {ϕ} is not strongly consistent. So, there is r ∈ A ∪ {1} such that
T ∪{ϕ} ⊢ r¯. Thus, T ⊢ ϕ→ r¯. Since A′ = {0}, there is s ∈ A∪ {1} such that s < r. By the assumption
s¯ → ϕ ∈ T . i.e, T ⊢ s¯ → ϕ. Hence, by transitivity property of proof T ⊢ s¯ → r¯ and by RG2(b), T ⊢ r¯.
A contradiction. 
Observe that by Zorn’s lemma, any strongly consistent L-theory T contained in a maximally strongly
consistent L-theory. The following theorem show that this maximally strongly consistent extension could
be chosen in a language L′ ⊇ L such that it is Henkin. So, in the light of Theorem 3.8 the compactness
property of G[0,1],A is established for the case that A
′ = {0} and L is a countable first-order language.
Theorem 3.13. Let A′ = {0}. Every strongly consistent L-theory in G[0,1],A is contained in a maximally
strongly consistent deductively Henkin L′-theory such that L ⊆ L′.
Proof. Let T be a strongly consistent L-theory. T ′ will be constructed in countably many phases. Indeed,
T ′ is a maximally strongly consistent theory containing the union of countably many maximally strongly
consistent Li-theories Ti in which for every i ≥ 1, Li have a witness constant for each unprovable sentence
∀x ϕ(x) where ϕ(x) ∈ Form(Li−1). To this end, consider the following notions.
• L0 = L.
• F0 = Form(L0) and for i ≥ 1, Fi = Form(Li) \ Form(Li−1).
• For each i ≥ 1, Li = Li−1 ∪ {cϕ(x),r,s : ϕ(x) ∈ Fi−1, r, s ∈ A ∪ {1}, r > s} where each cϕ(x),r,s is
a new constant symbol.
• T ′0 = T .
• For nullary connectives r¯ and s¯ and formula ϕ(x), θϕ(x),r,s = (r¯ → ∀xϕ(x)) ∨ (ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s)→ s¯).
• For each i ≥ 1, T ′i = Ti−1 ∪ {θϕ(x),r,s : ϕ(x) ∈ Fi−1, r, s ∈ A ∪ {1}, r > s} where Ti−1 is a
maximally strongly consistent Li−1-theory containing T ′i−1.
Firstly, we show that for each i ≥ 0, T ′i is strongly consistent. Obviously, T
′
0 is strongly consistent.
Assume that for each k < n, T ′k is strongly consistent. Suppose that, on the contrary, T
′
n is not strongly
consistent. Thus, there exists t ∈ A ∪ {1} such that T ′n ⊢ t¯. Hence, there is a finite subset S of
Tn−1 such that S ∪ {θϕi(x),ri,si}
m
i=1 ⊢ t¯ and no proper subset of S ∪ {θϕi(x),ri,si}
m
i=1 proves t¯. Set,
Γ = {θϕi(x),ri,si}
m−1
i=1 . By deduction theorem, S ∪ Γ ⊢ θϕm(x),rm,sm → t¯. Consider the abbreviations
θm and cm for θϕm(x),rm,sm and cϕm(x),rm,sm , respectively. Since ϕ(cm) → s¯m ⊢ θm we have S ∪ Γ ⊢
(ϕ(cm) → s¯m) → t¯, which leads to deduce that Tn−1 ∪ Γ ⊢ s¯m → ∀xϕm(x). On the other hand,
as r¯m → ∀xϕm(x) ⊢ θm we have S ∪ Γ ⊢ (r¯m → ∀xϕm(x)) → t¯ and so one could conclude that
Tn−1 ∪ Γ ⊢ ∀xϕm(x)→ r¯m. Hence, Tn−1 ∪ Γ ⊢ s¯m → r¯m and so Tn−1 ∪ Γ ⊢ t¯ which is a contradiction.
Secondly, let L′ =
⋃
n≥0 Ln and take a maximally strongly consistent L
′-theory T ′, containing⋃
n≥0 Tn. T
′ is provably Henkin. Verily, if T ′ 0 ∀xϕ(x) for some ϕ(x) ∈ Form(L′) then by maxi-
mality of T ′ and Lemma 3.12-3 there is r ∈ A∪ {1} such that r¯ → ∀xϕ(x) /∈ T ′. Now, as A′ = {0} take
s ∈ A ∪ {1} such that s < r. As, (r¯ → ∀xϕ(x)) ∨ (ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s)→ s¯) ∈ T
′, maximality of T ′ and Lemma
3.12-2 implies that ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s) → s¯ ∈ T
′. Thus, by Lemma 3.12-3 T ′ 0 ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s), and the proof is
completed. 
Corollary 3.14. Let L be a countable first-order language. If A′ = {0} then G[0,1],A satisfy the com-
pactness property. Specially, G∗↓ admits the compactness property.
3.2. Entailment Compactness.
Now, we study the entailment compactness and approximate entailment compactness in Go¨del log-
ics G[0,1],A and G
∆
[0,1],A. Note that the usual compactness follows from the entailment compactness.
However, the method we use in this subsection based on the notion of ”finitely entailment” while the
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method used in the previous subsection is based on the notion of ”proof” and the concept of ”strongly
consistency”.
The following example show that the entailment compactness fails on G∗↓.
Example 3.15. let L = {ρ} where ρ is a nullary predicate symbol. Let T = { 1n → ρ}n∈N. One can
easily verify that in the Go¨del logic G∗↓, T |= ρ but T
f
✓|=ρ.
However, when A′ = {0}, the approximate entailment compactness holds in G[0,1],A.
Theorem 3.16. Let L be a countable first-order language, T be an L-theory, and ϕ be an L-sentence.
If A′ = {0} then the Go¨del logic G[0,1],A enjoys the approximate entailment compactness. Particularly,
in G∗↓ we have,
T |= ϕ if and only if T
f
|= 1n → ϕ for all integers n ≥ 1.
Proof. Let T |= ϕ. We want to show that T
f
|= r¯ → ϕ for all r ∈ A ∪ {1}. Suppose not. So, there exists
r0 ∈ A∪ {1} such that for any finite subset S of T , S ✓|= r0 → ϕ. Thus, for any finite subset S of T there
is a model M of S such that M✓|= r0 → ϕ, which means that M |= ϕ→ r0. Thus, for any finite subset
S of T , S ∪ {ϕ→ r0} is satisfiable. Hence, compactness property of G[0,1],A implies that T ∪ {ϕ→ r0}
is satisfiable which is in contradict with T |= ϕ.
Conversely, suppose that for any r ∈ A ∪ {1}, T
f
|= r¯ → ϕ. We want to show that T |= ϕ. Since T has
a model, by reductio ad absurdum suppose that there exists a model M of T such that M ✓|= ϕ. But
because A′ = {0}, one could find r ∈ A ∪ {1} such that ϕM ≥ r. This means for any finite subset S of
T , S ✓|= r¯ → ϕ, a contradiction. 
On the other hand, G∗n enjoys the entailment compactness. This follows from the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 3.17. Let L be a countable first-order language. Let A′ = ∅, T be a complete Henkin L-theory,
and ϕ be an L-sentence. In the Go¨del logic G[0,1],A, T |= ϕ if and only if T
f
|=ϕ.
Proof. Let Lind(T ) be the class of all T -equivalent L-sentences, i.e., the equivalence classes [ϕ]T of all
L-sentences ϕ modulo to the following equivalence relation.
ϕ ∼ ψ if and only if T
f
|=ϕ↔ ψ.
By the same way as the proof of Theorem 3.8 and replacing ⊢ by
f
|=we obtain an L-structure MT |= T .
Now, let T |= ϕ but T
f
✓|=ϕ. So, [ϕ]T  [0¯]T . But then since A
′ = ∅, the proof of Lemma 3.5 show that
ϕM = g([ϕ]T ) > 0, a contradiction. 
Remark 3.18. If A′ = {0} and [ϕ]T  [0¯]T , then g([ϕ]T ) does not necessarily grater than 0 (cf. proof of
Lemma 3.5, case 2).
Lemma 3.19. Let T be an L-theory, ϕ be an L-sentence, and T
f
✓|= ϕ. The followings are hold in
Go¨del logics G∆[0,1],A.
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(1) There exists a complete L-theory T ⊇ T such that T
f
✓|=ϕ.
(2) There exists a first-order language L′ ⊇ L and a complete Henkin L′-theory T ′ ⊇ T such that
T ′
f
✓|=ϕ.
Proof. Proof of (1) is straightforward. For (2) assume that
• L0 = L, T0 = T , ǫ0 = ϕ,
• for n ≥ 0, Tn be a complete theory containing Tn such that Tn
f
✓|=ǫn,
• for n ≥ 0, Ln+1 = Ln ∪ {ǫn+1} ∪ {cψ : Tn
f
✓|= ∀xψ(x)}, where ǫn+1 is a new nullary predicate
symbol and each cψ is a new constant symbol,
• for n ≥ 0, Tn+1 = Tn ∪ {ǫn → ǫn+1} ∪ {ψ(cψ)→ ǫn+1 : Tn
f
✓|=∀xψ(x)}.
We show that for each n ≥ 0, Tn
f
✓|= ǫn. Obviously T0
f
✓|= ǫ0. Assume that Tn
f
✓|= ǫn. We show that
Tn+1
f
✓|= ǫn+1. To this end, let A = B ∪ {ψi(cψi) → ǫn+1 : Tn
f
✓|=∀xψi(x)}
m
i=1 be a finite subset of Tn+1
in which B is a finite subset of Tn. Since Tn
f
✓|= ǫn and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, T n
f
✓|= ∀xψi(x) and Tn
is a complete Ln-theory, Tn
f
✓|= ǫn ∨
( ∨
1≤i≤m
∀xψi(x)
)
. Now, as B is a finite subset of Tn, there is an
Ln-structure M |= B such that min{ǫMn ,
(
∀xψ1(x)
)M
, ...,
(
∀xψm(x)
)M
} = α > 0. Interpreting ǫn+1 in
M by a nonzero rational number less that α leads to the fact that M |= A and M✓|= ǫn+1.
Now, let L′ = ∪∞n=0Ln and T
∗ = ∪∞n=0Tn. One could easily verify that T
∗ f
✓|=ϕ. Let T
′ be a complete
L′-theory containing T ∗ such that T ′
f
✓|= ϕ. Obviously the construction implies that T
′ is a complete
Henkin L′-theory. 
Now, in the light of Lemma 3.17 and Lemma 3.19 we deduced the entailment compactness of G∗n.
Corollary 3.20. Let L be a countable first-order language. G∗n enjoys the entailment compactness
property.
Remark 3.21. Let L be first-order language.When A′ = ∅ one could easily modify the proof of Lemma
3.5 and Lemma 3.17 to the case of Go¨del logics equipped with the unary connective ∆. So by Lemma
3.19, G∆[0,1],A admit the compactness as well as the entailment compactness.
Despite the compactness property of G∆[0,1],A for finite set A, this fails in G
∆
[0,1],A if A
′ = {0}.
Example 3.22. Let L contain a nullary predicate symbol ρ and let T = {ρ→ 1n}n∈N∪{¬(∆(ρ))}. One
can easily verify that in the Go¨del logic G∆[0,1],(0,1)↓ , T is finitely satisfiable but it is not satisfiable.
4. Compactness when the underlying language is uncountable
As already mentioned, all the compactness results in Go¨del logics are restricted by the countabil-
ity of the underlying language. The following example shows that when the underlying language is
uncountable, the compactness fails in almost all extensions of Go¨del logics.
Example 4.1. [Jerˇ14] Let L be a relational language contains uncountably many unary predicate
symbols {R(x)} ∪ {ρi(x)}i∈(ω1+1). Set,
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T = {¬∀xR(x), ∀x
(
ρ1(x)⇒ R(x)
)
} ∪ {∀x
(
ρi(x)⇒ ρj(x)
)
: i > j}i,j∈(ω1+1)
Clearly, in any Go¨del logic G[0,1],A, T is finitely satisfiable but it is not satisfiable.
However, when V ′ ⊆ {0} we show that the Go¨del logic GV,A may admit the compactness property,
even for uncountable first order languages. Note that in the above example, T is not finitely satisfiable
in Go¨del logics with truth value set V such that V ′ ⊆ {0}.
We prove the compactness theorem by the ultraproduct method. For doing this we need a similarity
relation. In metrically semantic of t-norm based fuzzy logics, the interpretation of similarity relation is
a pseudo-metric.
4.1. Ultrametric structure.
One of the most important tools in classical first-order logic is the equality relation. The advantage
of this relation appears almost in all results of model theory of classical first-order logic.
Equality relation has some common properties, called Similarity Axioms.
(1) (Reflexivity) ∀x (x ≈ x).
(2) (Symmetry) ∀x∀y (x ≈ y → y ≈ x).
(3) (Transitivity) ∀x∀y∀z ((x ≈ y ∧ y ≈ z)→ x ≈ z).
Let d be a binary predicate symbol in the language Ld that we want to role as equality relation in
classical first-order logic. If M be an Ld-structure such that
M |= {∀x d(x, x), ∀x∀y (d(x, y)→ d(y, x)) , ∀x∀y∀z ((d(x, y) ∧ d(y, z))→ d(x, z))},
then it is easy to see that dM must be a pseudo-ultrametric on the universe ofM (a pseudo-metric that
satisfies the strong triangle inequality, that is dM(a, b) ≤ max{dM(a, c), dM(b, c)} for all a, b, c ∈M).
Definition 4.2. For a given language Ld, containing a binary predicate symbol d, an Ld-ultrametric
structure or simply an ultrametric structure is an Ld-structure M where (M,dM) is an ultrametric
space.
Example 4.3. Any first-order structure with the discrete metric is an ultrametric structure.
Example 4.4. Let (M,d) be an ultrametric space. Define d′(x, y) =
d(x, y)
1 + d(x, y)
. (M,d′) is an ultra-
metric structure.
In classical first-order logic when P is an n-ary predicate symbol and f is an n-ary function symbol
and a¯ ∈ Mn is ”equal” to b¯ ∈ Mn, we have PM(a¯) = PM(b¯) (as subsets of Mn) and also fM(a¯) is
”equal” to fM(b¯). These properties express the extensional identically of a¯ and b¯ with respect to the
equality relation, which is called Congruence Axioms.
(4) For each n-ary predicate symbol P ,
∀x1...∀xn∀y1...∀yn
(
∧ni=1 (xi ≈ yi)→ (P (x1, ..., xn)↔ P (y1, ..., yn))
)
.
(5) For each n-ary function symbol f ,
∀x1...∀xn∀y1...∀yn
(
∧ni=1 (xi ≈ yi)→ (f(x1, ..., xn) ≈ f(y1, ..., yn))
)
.
Enforcing models to satisfy the congruence axioms leads to the right definition of structures in first-
order logic (that is the interpretation of an n-ary function symbol in a model M would be a function
fM :Mn →M and the interpretation of an n-ary predicate symbol P would be a subset of Mn).
Now, let the Ld-structure M satisfy the congruence axioms for each function and predicate symbol,
i.e,
M |= {∀x¯∀y¯(d(x¯, y¯)→ d(f(x¯), f(y¯)), ∀x¯∀y¯(d(x¯, y¯) → (P (x¯)↔ P (y¯))}f,P∈Ld ,
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in which d(x¯, y¯) is an abbreviation for ∧ni=1d(xi, yi). One can easily verify that for each function symbol
f , fM : (Mn, dM) → (M,dM) would be a 1-Lipschitz continuous function, in which dM is a pseudo-
ultrametric and dM(a¯, b¯) = max
1≤i≤n
{dM(ai, bi)} for every a¯, b¯ ∈ Mn. Furthermore, for each predicate
symbol P , PM : (Mn, dM)→ (V, dmax) is a 1-Lipschitz continuous function.
Definition 4.5. For a given language Ld, containing a binary predicate symbol d, a Lipschitz Ld-
structure or simply a Lipschitz structure M in the Go¨del logic GV is a nonempty pseudo-ultrametric
space (M,dM) called the universe of M together with:
a) for any n-ary predicate symbol P of L, a 1-Lipschitz continuous function
PM : (Mn, dM)→ (V, dmax),
b) for any n-ary function symbol f of L, a 1-Lipschitz continuous function fM : Mn →M ,
c) for any constant symbol c of L, an element cM in the universe of M.
The following lemma is used to prove the compactness property for the Go¨del logic G↓. It is used in
constructing a model for a theory with ultraproduct method.
Lemma 4.6. Let M be a Lipschitz Ld-structure. In the Go¨del logic GV,A for every Ld-formula ϕ(x¯)
and a¯, b¯ ⊆M ,
dmax
(
ϕM(a¯), ϕM(b¯)
)
≤ dM(a¯, b¯).
Proof. Using the 1-Lipschitz continuity of the interpretation of function and predicate symbols and also
1-Lipschitz continuity of
.→: (V 2, dmax)→ (V, dmax), the proof is straightforward. 
The 1-Lipschitz continuity of the interpretation of function and predicate symbols in Lipschitz struc-
tures leads to obtain a canonical ultrametric structure M/d from a given Lipschitz structureM. Verily,
the underlying universe of M/d is the set of equivalence classes of M modulo the equivalence relation
dM. Furthermore, the interpretation of symbols of the language could be defined by:
• cM/d = [cM]d,
• fM/d([a1]d, ..., [an]d) = fM(a1, ..., an),
• PM/d([a1]d, ..., [an]d) = PM(a1, ..., an).
Definition 4.7. An Ld-theory T is called a metric-satisfiable theory if there is an ultramtric structure
M which models T . Similarly, when T has a Lipschitz modelM, we call T a Lipschitz-satisfiable theory.
The notions of finitely metric-satisfiable and finitely Lipschitz-satisfiable theories are similarly defined.
4.2. Ultraproduct method and the compactness theorem.
Let L be a first-order language (of any cardinality) and T be a finitely satisfiable L-theory. Let
I = Pfin(T ) be the collection of all finite subsets of T . For every ϕ ∈ T assume that ϕT = {Σ : ϕ ∈
Σ and Σ ∈ I}. Obviously {ϕT : ϕ ∈ T } has the finite intersection property, and so it is contained in an
ultrafilter D on I.
Bellow we list some facts and notions about (ultra)filters on topological spaces.
• [Wil04] A filter F on a topological spaceX is convergent to x ∈ X if for all open sets U containing
x, U ∈ F .
• [Wil04] X is compact Hausdorff space if and only if every ultrafilter F on X has a unique limit
point.
• Let {xi}i∈I be a family of points of a topological space X . One could view {xi}i∈I as a function
f : I → X . If D is an (ultra)filter on I, then ID(X) = {A ⊆ X : f−1(A) ∈ D} is an (ultra)filter
on X . If ID(X) is convergent to an element x ∈ X , we call x a D-limit of the family {xi}i∈I .
• Obviously x is a D-limit of {xi}i∈I if and only if for each open set U containing x, the set
{i ∈ I : xi ∈ U} belongs to the (ultra)filter D.
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• If X is a compact Hausdorff and x is the unique D-limit of the family {xi}i∈I , we write limD xi =
x.
• If X and Y are two compact Hausdorff topological spaces, f : X → Y is a continuous function,
{xi}i∈I is a family of elements of X , and D is an ultrafilter on I, then f(limD xi) = limD f(xi).
Now, we can prove the compactness theorem.
Theorem 4.8. Let Ld be a first-order language and V ′ ⊆ {0}. In the Go¨del logic GV as well as the
Go¨del logic GV,V \{0,1}, every finitely Lipschitz-satisfiable theory T is Lipschitz-satisfiable.
Proof. Let I = Pfin(T ) be the collection of all finite subsets of T and D be an ultrafilter on I which
contain {ϕT : ϕ ∈ T } where ϕT = {Σ : ϕ ∈ Σ and Σ ∈ I}.
Since T is finitely Lipschitz-satisfiable, for each Ti ∈ I there is a Lipschitz structureMi which models
Ti. Let M =
∏
i∈IMi and for each n-ary predicate symbol R define R
M : Mn → V by
RM({x1i}i∈I , ..., {xni}i∈I) = limD RMi(x1i, ..., xni).
Note that V ′ ⊆ {0}. So (V, dmax) is a compact Hausdorff space. Thus, the D-limit of the family
{RMi(x1i, ..., xni)}i∈I is unique and therefore RM is well-defined.
One could easily verify that dM is a pseudo-ultrametric on M . Furthermore, Lipschitz continuity of
{RMi}i∈I implies that RM is Lipschitz continuous.
Now, for each constant symbol c let cM = {cMi}i∈I . Also, for each n-ary function symbol f de-
fine fM : Mn → M by fM({x1i}i∈I , ..., {xni}i∈I) = {f
Mi(x1i, ..., xni)}i∈I . Note that, by Lipschitz
continuity of {fMi}i∈I , fM is well-defined and Lipschitz continuous.
Finally, by an induction on the complexity of formulas and using the Lipschitz continuity of {RMi}i∈I
and also Lipschitz continuity of logical connectives on (V, dmax), it is easy to see that for each formula
ϕ(x1, ..., xn) and elements ak = {aki}i∈I of M for 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
ϕM(a1, ..., an) = limD ϕ
Mi(a1i, ..., ani).
Thus, M is a Lipschitz model of T . 
5. final remarks and further works
We study the compactness property of extensions of first-order Go¨del logic with truth constants or with
the Baaz’s ∆ connective. The compactness theorem is one of the basic theorems that is used in the model
theory of classical first-order logic. Using the ultraproduct method, we prove the compactness theorem
for theories whose underlying first-order language are uncountable. But, the ultraproduct method forced
us to consider the Go¨del sets with the reverse semantical meaning to interpret the similarity relation as a
(pseudo) metric. Thus, semantically 0 is the absolute truth and 1 is the absolute falsity. The translation
of results for the usual semantic of Go¨del logic could be stated as follows:
(1) (Corollary 3.10 and Corollary 3.20) If A′ = ∅ then for any countable first-order language L, the
Go¨del logic G[0,1],A admits the compactness property as well as the entailment compactness.
(2) (Corollary 3.14, Example 3.15, and Theorem 3.16) If A′ = {1} then for any countable first-order
language L, the Go¨del logic G[0,1],A admits the compactness property as well as the approximate
entailment compactness, while the entailment compactness fails.
(3) (Example 3.1) The compactness property fails in G[0,1],A whenever A has a limit point a 6= 1
such that a ∈ A ∪ {0}. In particular, RGL (first-order Go¨del logic enriched with rational truth
constants A = (0, 1) ∩Q as nullary connectives) fails to have the compactness property.
(4) (Theorem 4.8) If V ′ ⊆ {1} then in the Go¨del logics GV and GV,V \{0,1} every finitely Lipschitz-
satisfiable theory is Lipschitz-satisfiable.
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(5) (Remark 3.21) If A is finite then G∆[0,1],A admit the compactness property as well as the entailment
compactness property.
(6) (Example 3.1, Example 3.22) If A′ = {1} or A′ = {0} then the compactness fails in G∆[0,1],A.
Regarding the first-order Go¨del logic, it is seen that the absolute truth and absolute falsity has an
asymmetry. Indeed, not falsity could be stated while it is impossible to separate truth from not truth.
The outcome of equipping the Go¨del logic with ∆ is objective as a kind of symmetry. Indeed, not only
one could states ”not truth” as well as the ”not falsity”, but also we have a symmetry in items (5) and
(6), and also the results are hold in both semantical views of the Go¨del logic.
A future interesting topic to study is the model theoretical aspects of G↓, G
∗
↓ and G
∆
[0,1]. Indeed, the
expressive power of the language of this logics for stating ”M✓|=ϕ” by means of ”M |= ¬∆(ϕ)” or ”there
is a natural number n such that M |= ϕ→ 1¯n”, helps us to develop the model theory of these logics.
Acknowledgments: Author is indebted to Massoud Pourmahdian for his enlightening contributions
through the preparation of this work.
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